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Benefits Without Proof. The North Carolina Supreme Court
Creates a Presumption of Compensability in Workers'

Compensation Death Benefits Actions
While the North Carolina Work[ers'] Compensation Act should be liberally construed so as to effectuate the legislative intent which is to be
ascertained from the wording of the Act, the rule of liberal construction cannot be extended beyond the clearly expressed language of the
act. "It is ours to construe the laws, and not to make them."'
North Carolina's workers' compensation statute 2 sets forth five elements
that comprise a claim for death benefits. 3 The claimant bears the burden of
proof for each of these elements. 4 Workers' compensation cases, therefore, usually turn on whether the facts fulfill the required elements. The courts traditionally have hesitated to create exceptions permitting recovery with proof of fewer
than the five elements, or to transfer the burden of proof with respect to one or
more elements to the defendant. Temptation to recognize exceptions or to allow
recovery without rigorous proof grows, however, when a sympathetic claimant
has simply botched his case and failed to establish the elements prescribed. The
danger of allowing recovery in a case like this, of course, is that the means by
which the court grants relief will be available to all future claimants, unless the
exception is so closely tailored to the facts as to be inapplicable to other situations. To preserve in undiluted form the scheme established by North Carolina's
General Assembly, and to avoid a steady expansion of workers' compensation
coverage beyond that originally intended, 5 the courts must avoid creating sweeping exceptions, even when the alternative is to leave an individual without
remedy.
In Pickrellv. Motor Convoy, Inc.6 the North Carolina Supreme Court surrendered to temptation and recognized a previously unarticulated evidentiary
presumption 7 in favor of a sympathetic death benefits claimant. The court held
1. Gilmore v. Hoke County Bd.ofEduc., 222 N.C. 358, 366, 23 S.E,2d 292, 297 (1942) (quoting State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621, 626, 107 S.E. 505, 508 (1921)).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1985 & Supp. 1988). The short title of the statute is The
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Id. § 97-1 (1985).
3. Section 97-2(6) defines an injury that is compensable by workers' compensation as "only
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6)
(1985). In addition, § 97-2(10) provides that "the term 'death' as a basis for a right to compensation
means only death resulting from an injury." Id. § 97-2(10) (1985); see also id. § 97-38 (Supp. 1988)
(award to survivors when "death results proximately from a compensable injury or occupational
disease"). Taken together, these sections indicate five elements for a death benefits claim: (1) the
employee died as a proximate result (2) of an injury; (3) by accident; (4) arising out of employment;
and (5) in the course of employment. See Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 374,
64 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1951); Gilmore, 222 N.C. at 365, 23 S.E.2d at 296.
4. Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 366, 368 SE.2d 582, 584 (1988); Taylor v.
Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 437, 132 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1963); Anderson v. Northwestern Motor
Co., 233 N.C. 372, 374, 64 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1951); Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C.
477, 479, 57 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1950).
5. See Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 429, 146 S.E.2d 479, 486 (1966).
6. 322 N.C. 363, 368 S.E.2d 582 (1988).
7. A presumption is a rule of law that reduces the evidentiary burden on the party seeking to
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that the unexplained death of an employee gives rise to a "presumption of compensability," relieving a survivor of the burden of producing evidence as to one
or more of the elements of his death benefits action.8
This Note examines evidentiary burdens in North Carolina workers' compensation law and questions whether precedent exists for the presumption the
Pickrell court recognized. The Note concludes that the "presumption of com-

pensability" does not follow logically from prior decisions as the Pickrell court
asserted, but instead departs significantly from the explicit proof-of-elements re-

quirement of the Workers' Compensation Act and blurs traditional distinctions
between workers' compensation and general health and life insurance. The Note

further concludes that the court's presumption in favor of death benefits claimants saddles employers with an unfair evidentiary burden and encourages claim-

ants to withhold evidence.
Clyde Pickrell was employed to drive truckloads of automobiles from his
employer's terminal to dealers. His duties included inspecting new cars and
vans for damage at the terminal and loading them onto tractor-trailers. Pickrell
and other drivers typically inspected the roofs of vans for damage by standing on
the bumpers or door frames of the vehicles. On January 17, 1983, in cold
weather, Pickrell was found lying dead behind a van assigned to him. A small

amount of blood emanated from his nose and ear. On the bumper of the van
was a scuff mark that could have been made by Pickrell's shoe. 9

A Deputy Commissioner of the Industrial Commission

°

denied Pickrell's

establish a certain fact. In North Carolina, when a presumption applies it usually has the effect
stated in the Rules of Evidence:
[A) presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party
the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout
the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
N.C. R. EVID. 301. The burden cast upon the adverse party by the presumption is termed the
burden of production or the burden of producing evidence. The proponent of the presumption continues to bear the burden of proof or persuasion. Id.
Rule 301 does not bind the courts to give the described effect to all presumptions. Statutes,
judicial decisions, or another rule of evidence may specify a different effect, such as shifting the
burden of persuasion. Id.; 2 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 215, at 187
n.94 (3d ed. 1988); id. § 218, at 194-96.
Other than the "true" or "mandatory" presumption, the effect of which is described in rule 301,
two types of presumptions are common: conclusive and permissive. The conclusive presumption
operates so that upon establishment of a basic fact, the presumed or elemental fact is deemed to be
conclusively established, and contrary evidence will not be heard. Id. § 215, at 185. An example of
a conclusive presumption in the Workers' Compensation Act is that a widow, widower, or dependent child is conclusively presumed to be dependent upon a deceased employee for support. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-39 (1985). Thus, once the basic fact is established that the claimant is the widow,
widower, or dependent child of the deceased employee, the Industrial Commission should not hear
evidence from the defendant-employer that the claimant was not dependent upon the deceased for
support.
The permissive presumption allows but does not compel the finder of fact to find the presumed
fact even if the adverse party introduces no evidence contrary to the presumption. Professor Brandis
says this is, in reality, an "inference," and that confusion results from using the term "presumption"
to describe this effect. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra, § 215, at 186.
8. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 368-69, 368 S.E.2d at 585.
9. This is a summary of the court's rendition of the facts. See id. at 364-65, 368 S.E.2d at 583.
10. Under North Carolina's workers' compensation system, if an employer and an injured em-
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widow's claim for death benefits. He found that the claimant had failed to meet
her burden of proving that the death resulted from an injury by accident because
of the complete absence of medical evidence' I of the cause of Pickrell's death. I2
The deputy held that physical evidence was sufficient, however, to permit an
inference that an accident had occurred.t 3 The full Commission and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of benefits.14
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. 15 In an
opinion by Chief Justice Exum, the court held that a general presumption of
compensability, sufficient to establish one or more unproven elements of a claim,
arises in favor of a death benefits claimant whenever an employee dies in the
course and scope of his employment under unexplained circumstances. 1 6 In the
instant case, the presumption of compensability relieved the claimant of the bur7
den of producing any evidence of the medical cause of the employee's death.'
Chief Justice Exum explained that the presumption of compensability described by the court is not a novelty, but is supported by previous workers' compensation decisions. In particular, he cited two death benefits decisions in which
plaintiffs were allowed to recover due to presumptions, although they were unable to prove an element of their claims, either the element of "accidental" injury or injury "arising out of employment."' 8 Although each case nominally
addressed only a single element, the court viewed the presumptions in those
ployee or his dependents fail to reach agreement within fourteen days of the accident regarding
compensation for the injury, either party may apply to the Industrial Commission for a hearing.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-83 (1985). The hearing may be conducted by a deputy to the Commission, id.
§ 97-84 (Supp. 1988), who is appointed by the Commission, id. § 97-79(b) (1985). Appeal may be
taken from the award of the Deputy Commissioner to the full Commission, which conducts a de
novo proceeding. Id. § 97-85. From the award of the full Commission, further appeal lies to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, although the findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive. Id. § 97-86.
11.

Cf.lB A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.83(a), at 7-273 (1987)

(discussing the need to break up the element of accident to component parts of legal and medical
causation); id. § 38.83(h), at 7-308 to -314 ("but if the employee's activity at the time involves no
effort, or effort which cannot support medically a causal connection, it can be rightly said that the
outcome was neither accidental nor causally related to the employment" (emphasis added)); id.
§ 38.83(i), at 7-319 ("Probably the commonest reason for defeated claims is simply the general inadequacy of proof connecting the injury medically with the employment."). See supra note 3 for a list
of the elements of a death benefits claim.
12. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 365-66 & n.l, 368 S.E.2d at 583 & n.l.
13. Id. at 365 n.1, 368 S.E.2d at 583 n.l.
14. The full Industrial Commission modified the findings of the Deputy Commissioner, holding
that the evidence did not support even the inference of an accident. Id. at 365-66, 368 S.E.2d at 583.
The court of appeals affirmed the result of both the Industrial Commission and the Deputy Commissioner denying death benefits, but reinstated the Deputy Commissioner's finding that the evidence
permitted an inference that "decedent stepped up onto the bumper of the van during the course of
his inspection and that he fell" accidentally. Id. at 366, 368 S.E.2d at 583-84. The court stated that
although the Industrial Commission had denominated its finding one of fact, in reality it was a
conclusion of law and thus within the ambit of appellate review. Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 82
N.C. App. 238, 241, 346 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 322 N.C. 363, 372, 368
S.E.2d 582, 587 (1988).
15. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 372, 368 S.E.2d at 587.
16. Id. at 368-69, 368 S.E.2d at 585.
17. Id. at 369-70, 368 S.E.2d at 585-86. See supra note 11 for a discussion of the usual need for
medical evidence.
18. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 367-69, 368 S.E.2d at 584-85 (citing McGill v. Town of Lumberton,
215 N.C. 752, 3 S.E.2d 324 (1939); Harris v. Henry's Auto Parts, Inc., 57 N.C. App. 90, 290 S.E.2d
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cases as having the broader effect of merging several elements of the claim into

the single concept of "work-relatedness."

19

According to Chief Justice Exum,

"It is [work-relatedness], not the medical reasonsfor death, which [is] critical in
20
determining whether a claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits."
Thus, the Pickrell court held, "claimants should be able to rely on a presump-

tion that death was work-related, and therefore compensable, whether the medical reason for death is known or unknown." 2 1
Resolving ambiguity in the two underlying cases, the court also held that
' 22
When it arises
the presumption of compensability is a "true presumption."
"the defendant must come forward with some evidence that death occurred as a
'23
The
result of a noncompensable cause; otherwise, the claimant prevails."
court stated that the resulting allocation of the burden of proof is fair because

to present evidence of the cause of death than
the employer is in a better position
24
the survivor of the employee.

Justice Meyer, joined by Justices Webb and Whichard, dissented, arguing
that the majority misconstrued precedent in fashioning the presumption of com-

pensability. 25 The dissenters argued that the presumptions in prior cases were
limited expressly to the elements of proof of "accident" and "arising out of em-

ployment" and were not tantamount to a "new animal called a 'presumption of
compensability.' "26 Distinct elements of the claimant's burden of proof under
the workers' compensation statute cannot be merged, the dissenters contended.
The claimant must prove each element independently, although she may avail
herself of presumptions for specific elements. 27 Justice Meyer stated that placing the burden of producing contrary evidence on the employer is unfair because
of the employer's relative inability to secure medical evidence by autopsy. The
dissent contended finally that the practical effect of the presumption of compensability is to allow "the potential of the perpetration of a fraud by withholding
'28
evidence."
716, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 384, 294 S.E.2d 208 (1982)). See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of McGill, and notes 54-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Harris.
19. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 368, 368 S.E.2d at 584-85.
20. Id. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586 (emphasis added).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 371, 368 S.E.2d at 586. Courts, particularly in early decisions, have used the terms
"presumption" and "inference" interchangeably and ambiguously. N.C. R. EvID. 301 commentary;
2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 7, § 215, at 184 & n.82. However, in the truest sense, a presumption
requires the finder of fact to find the presumed fact upon proof of the basic or underlying fact and in
the absence of contrary evidence from the adverse party, while an inference allows, but does not
compel the trier of fact to conclude the presumed fact when the basic fact is proved. 2 H. BRANDIS,
supra note 7, § 215, at 186-89.
23. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 371, 368 S.E.2d at 586. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the effects
of presumptions.
24. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586.
25. Id. at 372-74, 368 S.E.2d at 587-88 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
27. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 374, 368 S.E.2d at 588 (Meyer, J.,dissenting). Justice Meyer implied that a claimant
with access to the deceased employee's medical records may withhold evidence of personal afflictions, knowing that the employer-defendant cannot get the information and will lose without it. Id.
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
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The North Carolina courts' long-standing tradition of placing the eviden-

tiary burdens upon workers' compensation claimants is the linchpin that balances two competing objectives of the Workers' Compensation Act. On one

hand, the Workers' Compensation Act should be construed liberally to effectuate the objects for which it was passed: to give the employee a cause of action
against the employer for injuries caused by the employer's enterprise. 29 On the
other hand, the courts frequently allude to their obligation to prevent the work-

ers' compensation system from developing into a general health and life insurance scheme. 30 Thus, although the employee has a more easily sustainable cause
of action by statute than by common law, he must prove the elements of his
statutory claim as if it were an ordinary civil action.

The courts consistently have protected this balance of objectives, but they
also have recognized exceptions in the statute that slightly reallocate evidentiary
burdens in special situations. The hallmark of these exceptions is their restrictive applicability to unusual circumstances in which the claimant could not reasonably be expected to carry his burden of proof. Exceptions include the
"unexplained injury or death" doctrine, the "positional risk" doctrine, and the
presumption against suicide.
The unexplained-injury-or-death doctrine reduces the claimant's burden of
proving the "arising out of employment" element of the workers' compensation

claim.3 ' When injury or death occurs mysteriously or in an unexplained manner
while the employee clearly is in the scope of his employment, an inference or
presumption arises in favor of the claimant that the injury arose out of employment.3 2 North Carolina explicitly embraced this doctrine in Taylor v. Twin City
Club 33 in 1963.
In Taylor a waiter for defendant restaurant fell and struck his head on a
door, causing a deep, seven-inch laceration. The waiter was rendered uncon29. See, e.g., Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586; Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281
N.C. 300, 303, 188 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1972); Keller v. Electric Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 225, 130
S.E.2d 342, 344 (1963); see also Williams v. Thompson, 200 N.C. 463, 464, 157 S.E. 430, 430 (1931)
(Workers' Compensation Act is liberally construed because it is a "humane undertaking"); Rice v.
Denny Roll & Panel Co., 199 N.C. 154, 157, 154 S.E. 69, 71 (1930) ("the several parts... of an act
are to be construed in connection with every other part or section and all are to be considered as
parts of a connected whole and harmonized, if possible, so as to aid in giving effect to the intention of
the lawmakers"); Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 40, 153 S.E. 591, 593 (1930) ("benefits... should not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation").
30. Bryan v. First Free Will Baptist Church, 267 N.C. 111, 115, 147 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1966);
Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 91, 66 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1951); Vause v. Vhuse Farm Equip.
Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951); see also Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 105,
301 S.E.2d 359, 371-72 (1983) (discussing need to strike balance between interpreting liberally and
avoiding transformation of system into a general accident and health insurance law).
31. See supra note 3 stating the elements the claimant normally must prove.
32. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 10.32, at 3-100, quoted in Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 367, 368
S.E.2d at 584.
33. 260 N.C. 435, 439-40, 132 S.E.2d 865, 868-69 (1963). The Taylor court relied on Upton v.
Great Cent. Ry., 1924 App. Cas. 302, the seminal English case in the development of the unexplained-injury-or-death doctrine. In Upton an employee fell and injured his knee while traversing a
railway platform on an errand for his employer. He later died from blood poisoning. There was no
evidence of the cause of his fall, yet the House of Lords held that the death arose out of employment.
Id. at 302, 315-17.
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scious and died from loss of blood. 3 4 The court held that the survivor's claim
for benefits did not fail for lack of evidence as to the efficient cause of the
waiter's fall; rather, the facts "permit[ted] the inference" that the fall arose out
35
of employment.
The Taylor court explained that the causal relationship inherent in the arising-out-of-employment element does not depend on either the negligence of the
employer 36 or the contributory negligence of the employee.3 7 Except in extreme
cases of employee misconduct, therefore, employee fault does not preclude a
finding that an accident arose from employment, and any inquiry into employee
and employer fault is implicitly superfluous. Only the possibility that the employee's injury or death may have arisen from an idiopathic factor has an effect
on claimant's ability to recover. 38 As to possible idiopathic causes, the Taylor
court held that if the circumstances of the fall are unknown, an inference will be
allowed that no idiopathic or personal cause existed and that the cause was neutral.3 9 If "the Commission [then] finds from all of the attendant facts and circumstances that the injury arose out of the employment, an award will be
sustained." 40
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly articulated and embraced the unexplained death and injury doctrine for the first time in Taylor, the
doctrine had been a functional part of North Carolina workers' compensation
law for some time prior to that decision. In Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, 4 1
an early workers' compensation case, claimant was injured when she lost her
balance and fell while reaching up to a rack at her work place. The court stated,
"There is no evidence tending to show that the fall was caused by a hazard to
which the workman would have been exposed apart from the employment or
from a hazard common to others." 42 Accordingly, the court concluded,
[W]here the employee, while about his work, suffers an injury in the
ordinary course of the employment, the cause of which is unexplained
but which is a natural and probable result of a risk thereof, and the
34. Taylor, 260 N.C. at 436-37, 132 S.E.2d at 866-67.
35. Id. at 440, 132 S.E.2d at 869 (citing Upton, 1924 App. Cas. at 315).
36. Id. at 438-39, 132 S.E.2d at 868.
37. Id. at 439-40, 132 S.E.2d at 869. The court stated that "'the accident having been caused
by the doing of [a business errand] even incautiously, it must, I think, be held that the accident arose
out of the employment of the deceased.'" Id. (quoting Upton, 1924 App. Cas. at 315 (Opinion of
Lord Atkinson)).
38. The Taylor court stated, "If a fall and the resultant injury arise solely from an idiopathic
cause, or a cause independent of the employment, the injury is not compensable." Id. at 439, 132
S.E.2d at 868. An idiopathic injury is one that results from a cause peculiar to the individual or
arises spontaneously. See WEBSTER'S NEw NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 598 (1986).
39. Taylor, 260 N.C. at 439-40, 132 S.E.2d at 868-69. Professor Larson explains:
The theoretical justification is similar to that for unexplained falls and other neutral harms:
The occurrence of the death within the course of employment at least indicates that the
employment brought deceased within range of the harm, and the cause of harm, being
unknown, is neutral and not personal.
I A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 10.32, at 3-101 to 3-103.
40. Taylor, 260 N.C. at 439, 132 S.E.2d at 868.
41. 220 N.C. 246, 17 S.E.2d 20 (1941).
42. Id. at 247, 17 S.E.2d at 21.
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Commission finds from all the attendant facts and circumstances that
43

the injury arose out of the employment, an award will be sustained.

The Robbins court neither referred to the unexplained injury or death doctrine

by name, nor cited Upton v. Great Central Railway Co.,44 the original unexplained injury or death doctrine case, but nonetheless it captured the essence of
45
the doctrine in the permissible inference it described.

The unexplained death and injury doctrine, as illustrated in Taylor and
Robbins, is characteristic of the exceptions the North Carolina courts have de-

veloped to the general policy of allocating the burden of proof to the claimant in
workers' compensation cases. The doctrine applies only when the factual cause

of the employee's injury or death is unexplained. The reallocation of evidentiary
burdens is limited, affecting only the arising-out-of-employment element of the

claim and reducing claimant's evidentiary burden only if the Commission
chooses to draw the permissible inference. 4 6 Finally, the inference (or presump-

tion) is allowed because a claimant could not reasonably be expected to produce
evidence on the arising-out-of-employment element when the only person with

personal knowledge, the employee, is silenced by death.
A distinct, but closely related, exception providing for reallocation of the

evidentiary burdens in workers' compensation cases is the doctrine of positional
risks, which also gives rise to an inference or presumption on the element of
arising-out-of-employment. This doctrine applies if the claimant can show that
his accident occurred because "the employment required [him] to occupy what
turned out to be a place of danger." 4 7 The unexplained injury and death doctrine is really a subpart of the positional risk doctrine, 48 although many decisions blend the two. 49
43. Id. at 248, 17 S.E.2d at 21 (emphasis added). The language of both Robbins and Taylor
indicates that the court was applying a permissible inference due to the unexplained death and injury
doctrine, as contrasted with a presumption. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the distinction between a permissible inference and a true presumption.
44. 124 App. Cas. 302; see supra note 33 (discussing Upton).
45. The unexplained death doctrine also appeared unarticulated in other pre-Taylorcases. See,
e.g., DeVine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N.C. 684, 685, 44 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1947) (affirming award of death
benefits on behalf of employee who fell while lowering flag, court held the impact of deceased's skull
on ground was the medical cause of death, although the cause of the employee's fall was unknown);
Rewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 226 N.C. 325, 328-30, 38 S.E.2d 97, 99-100 (1946) (affirming
award of death benefits when employee with Crone's disease sought comfort at bathroom window
and subsequently fell, unseen; the fall to the ground was the medical cause of death; although the
cause of the fall was unknown, the Commission's inference that the employee slipped on slick tile
was affirmed against the contention that the more likely cause of the fall was the employee's preexisting idiopathic condition). See supra note 11 citing cases that discuss the need for evidence of
medical and legal cause.
A North Carolina Court of Appeals case has articulated a possibly significant limitation to the
unexplained death doctrine. In Gilbert v. B & S Contractors,Inc. the court of appeals held that only
a violent death gives rise to a presumption or inference that death arose out of employment. 81 N.C.
App. 110, 113, 343 S.E.2d 609, 611 (1986) (affirming denial of benefits when medical evidence indicated employee's collapse and death likely resulted from arterial disease, although electric shock was
also possible). The supreme court made no reference to Gilbert in Pickrell, however, so the vitality
of the limitation is questionable.
46. See supra note 7.
47. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 10, at 3-71.
48. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, §§ 10.00, 10.31, 10.32, at 3-71, 3-87, 3-100.
49. Thus, in Rewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 226 N.C. 325, 38 S.E.2d 97 (1946), the supreme
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The majority opinion in Pickrell relied in part on the unexplained death
doctrine and, perhaps, the positional risk doctrine. Early in the decision, Chief
Justice Exum quoted Professor Larson's discussion of the unexplained death
doctrine.50 The court described the quoted doctrine, however, as giving rise to a
presumption "that the death resulted proximately from a work-related injury."51 Further, the court defined "work-related" as "from an injury by accident arising out of employment."'52 Thus defined, the unexplained death
presumption encompasses all of the elements of the death benefits claim except
that the accident occurred "in the course and scope of employment."' 53 The
Pickrell court's statement of the doctrine is the most expansive ever by a North

Carolina court.
The positional risk doctrine also might underlie the Pickrellcourt's reason-

ing, given that the deceased apparently was standing on the bumper of the van at
the time of the accident, an elevated position that presented additional danger.
The court did not mention the positional risk doctrine, however, and gave no
indication that the doctrine was the source of its broad "work-relatedness"

definition.
Apart from the unexplained death and injury doctrine and the positional
risk doctrine, the Pickrellcourt emphasized and sought support from two particular workers' compensation cases in which evidentiary burdens were reallocated.
Combining the doctrines and the two cases, the court fashioned its presumption

of compensability.
One of the cases that the court relied on was Harrisv. Henry's Auto Parts,

Inc.54 in which a service station employee was found shot dead in the station
court acknowledged, "It is true that no one saw the deceased slip on the tile, and in fact no one saw
him fall to his death." Id. at 330, 38 S.E.2d at 100. Although this language implicates the unexplained death doctrine, the court did not restrict the basis of its decision to the unexplained death
analysis. Rather, the court intermingled it with the positional risk doctrine, relating several situations in which the risks of the work locale determined the issue of compensability. Id. at 328-29, 38
S.E.2d at 99-100 (discussing Rockford Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 300 Ill. 87, 88-89, 132 N.E.
759, 759-60 (1921) (worker's fall into ash pit and subsequent death arose out of employment because
work placed employee near pit; compensation awarded notwithstanding direct cause of fall was employee's idiopathic condition)). But cf.Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 98, 63 S.E.2d
173, 180-81 (1951) (distinguishing and holding uncompensable employee's injury caused by fall from
truck during epileptic seizure on grounds that truck was stopped before onset of seizure, eliminating
any employment-caused position of danger).
In DeVine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N.C. 684, 44 S.E.2d 77 (1947), the supreme court alluded to
the positional risk doctrine, affirming a finding of the Industrial Commission that "the fall caused
the death of plaintiffs' deceased and that he was subject to a peculiar hazard on account of being
required to stand on the cement platform [from which he fell] and lower the flag." Id. at 685-86, 44
S.E.2d at 78. The court also impliedly invoked the unexplained death doctrine when it stated that
"[t]he exact cause of the fall is not determined." Id. at 685, 44 S.E.2d at 78. Although these cases
do not distinguish clearly between the effects of the unexplained death and injury and positional risk
doctrines, the positional risk doctrine might apply when the unexplained injury or death doctrine
does not. As an example, when an accident is observed by eyewitnesses, and therefore is explained,
the positional risk doctrine could apply if the risk was indigenous to the location of the employment.
50. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 367, 368 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting 1A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 10.32,
at 3-100).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 366, 368 S.E.2d at 584.
53. See supra note 3 (enumerating the statutory elements of the death benefit claim).
54. 57 N.C. App. 90, 290 S.E.2d 716, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 384, 294 S.E.2d 208 (1982).
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parking lot during his nighttime shift. The shot had been fired from behind a
fence on the perimeter of the property. There was neither evidence of a robbery
attempt nor a motive for the shooting. 55
The Industrial Commission awarded death benefits and the court of appeals
affirmed. 5 6 The decision of the court of appeals appears to have rested upon a
combination of the unexplained death and positional risk doctrines. The Harris
court stated, "This case requires resolution of a dispute regarding only one ofthe
57
elements [of the workers' compensation claim, the 'arisingout of' element."
The court reiterated that the arising-out-of-employment element requires
"'some causal relation between the accident and the performance of some service of the employment.' "58 Although the injury was caused by willful criminal
assault, the Harris court stated it might yet have arisen out of the attendant's
employment.5 9 If the attack was shown to be personal and due to a risk not
created by employment, however, it would not have satisfied the arising-out-of60
employment element.
The Harriscourt described the unexplained death doctrine and concluded,
"Mr. Harris' death was unexplained. Because he was found dead on the premises of his employment at a time when he should have been there, we indulge a
presumption or inference that his death arose out of the employment." '6 1 The
court then stated: "The deceased's job was of a nature which would subject him
to peril.... He was the sole employee on duty in, what the record shows, was a
high crime area." 62 Thus, the court based its resolution of the sole issuewhether death arose out of employment-on both the unexplained death doctrine and the positional risk doctrine.
In McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 63 the other case on which the Pickrell
court relied, the issue was whether to apply an inference or presumption to the
unproved "accident" element of claimant's case. Defendant town's police chief
was found shot dead in a manner suggesting suicide. 64 The supreme court held
that the claimant for death benefits was "entitled at least to the benefit of the
inference of accident [as opposed to suicide] from which, nothing else appearing,
the Commission may find but is not compelled to find, the fact of death resulting
55. Id. at 90-91, 290 S.E.2d at 716-17.
56. Id. at 96, 290 S.E.2d at 720.
57. Id. at 91, 290 S.E.2d at 717 (emphasis added). The unexplained death and positional risk
doctrines traditionally have been directed to the element of arising out of employment. See supra
notes 32, 34, 40, 43 and accompanying text.
58. Harris,57 N.C. App. at 92, 290 S.E.2d at 717 (quoting Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C.
435, 438, 132 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1963)).
59. Id. at 95, 290 S.E.2d at 719.
60. Id. at 93, 290 S.E.2d at 718.
61. Id. at 95, 290 S.E.2d at 719 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 96, 290 S.E.2d at 719.
63. 215 N.C. 752, 3 S.E.2d 324 (1939).
64. Id. at 753, 3 S.E.2d at 325. The police chief was found dead in a room that could not be
entered without a key. He was killed by a single bullet that entered his forehead at the root of the
nose and traveled back and downward through his brain. The revolver that fired the bullet was
found near the police chief's body. Id. at 755, 3 S.E.2d at 326-27 (Barnhill, J., dissenting).
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from injury by accident."' 65 Although the court referred to the evidentiary rule
as an "inference," its effect is that of a presumption in some parts of the opinion,
and related authority discusses apresumption against suicide. 66 The court noted
that explicit language in the Workers' Compensation Act and the common law
67
support application of a presumption against suicide.
The McGill court held that in the workers' compensation context the pre-

sumption "is sufficient to raise aprimafaciecase as to accident only."'68 Further,
the court stated that once the claimant successfully invoked the presumption,

"[t]hen if [an] employer claims [the] death of [an] employee is by suicide, the
statute places the burden on [the employer] to go forward with proof negativing

the factual inference of death by accident."' 69 This language clearly shifts to the
defendant the burden ofproduction on the issue of accident, but not the burden
70
of persuasion, and therefore constitutes a true presumption.

The McGill court did not discuss the arising-out-of-employment element or
any other element of the claim. Instead, it remanded the case to the Industrial
71
Commission for reconsideration in light of the presumption against suicide.
The McGill majority did not make any statement concerning a merger of elements of the claim or place the case in a procedural posture indicating that their
decision resolved the entire claim. In fact, by stating that the presumption made

a prima facie case of "accident only," the majority affirmatively indicated that it
did not intend the presumption to be determinative of the entire claim or to
merge elements of the claim. 72 On remand, the claimant was required to prove
65. Id. at 754, 3 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added).
66. See supra note 22 for a discussion of the interchangeable use of "presumption" and "inference" in early decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70 for a discussion of the presumption-like effect in McGill.
67. McGill, 215 N.C. at 754, 3 S.E.2d at 326; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1985). "No compensation shall be payable if the injury or death to the employee was proximately caused by: ...(3)
His willful intention to injure or kill himself or another.... The burden of proofshall be upon him
who claims an exemption orforfeiture under this section." Id. (emphasis added). This language creates a presumption which shifts not only the burden of production, but the ultimate burden of persuasion as well. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the General Assembly's power to create
presumptions of greater than normal effect. The effect is clearly greater than that of an inference.
Despite this rather strong language, however, the McGill court applied an apparent presumption
that shifted only the burden of production. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
At common law, there is also a presumption against suicide. The presumption derives from the
notion that love of life prevents rational persons from committing suicide. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note
7, § 224, at 211-12 n.82. The presumption most frequently arises in the context of actions to recover
on accidental death clauses of life insurance policies. Id. § 224, at 211; see Moore v. Union Fidelity
Life Ins. Co., 297 N.C. 375, 378-82, 255 S.E.2d 160, 163-65 (1979); Warren v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.,
215 N.C. 402, 404-05, 2 S.E.2d 17, 18 (1939); Gorham v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 526,
528-30, 200 S.E. 5, 6-8 (1938); Parker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 188 N.C. 403, 405, 125 S.E. 6, 7
(1924).
68. McGill, 215 N.C. at 754, 3 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. See supra note 7 for a discussion of evidentiary burdens allocated by presumptions.
71. McGill, 215 N.C. at 754, 3 S.E.2d at 326. The Pickrell court attached great significance to
this fact. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
72. McGill, 215 N.C. at 754, 3 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added). Justice Barnhill, however,
criticized the McGill majority for what he believed to be a disposition of the entire claim, arguing
that recognition of the presumption did not compensate for lack of proof on the elements other than
accident.
The evidence in the case cannot be construed as establishing a primafacie cause of action
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the other elements of the claim, while the presumption of accident would require

the employer to meet "the burden on him to go forward with proof negativing
the factual inference of death by accident" or risk a peremptory instruction on
73
that issue.
Combining the presumptions in McGill and Harris and the new, broad defi-

nition of the unexplained death doctrine, the Pickrellcourt crafted the rule that
the death benefits claimant was entitled to rely on a general presumption of
compensability because her husband died unobserved. 74 The authorities, however, in no way support the adopted rule. The presumption in McGill helped to

meet the claimant's burden on only the accident element of the claim. 75 The
inference or presumption in Harris,derived from the unexplained death and positional risk doctrines, helped claimant make a prima facie case on the arisingout-of-employment element. 76 Neither of these presumptions, however, related
in any way to the element of "death proximately caused by injury." 77 More-

over, neither presumption dealt with absence of medical evidence, proof of
which is fundamental to establishing the element of accident. 78

To arrive at its conclusion, the supreme court either must have found a way
to shake these presumptions loose from their moorings to specific elements of

the workers' compensation claim, or it must have concluded that certain elements of the traditional claim were not involved in Pickrell because of its facts.
Neither of these propositions is supportable.

The Pickrell court's juxtaposition of the dissimilar presumptions in McGill
and Harrisand its discussion of the unexplained death doctrine in the context of

work-relatedness indicate an effort to obfuscate previously clear connections between presumptions or inferences and isolated elements of the workers' compensation claim. For example, the court used the unexplained death doctrine, in
part, as the basis for a presumption eliminating the need for the claimant to
unless we hold that mere evidence that the deceased died from a pistol shot wound is
evidence not only of accidental death, but is also evidence that he suffered such injury by
accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment.
Id. at 756, 3 S.E.2d at 327 (Barbill, J.,
dissenting).
73. See id. at 754, 3 S.E.2d at 326. The effect indicated comports with the ordinary effect of a
true presumption. See supra note 7. No directed verdict on the whole claim results when the party
adverse to the presumption fails to meet his burden of producing contrary evidence; rather, the court
will instruct the jury that thepresumedfactonly is deemed proved. The remaining issues in the case
must yet be proved by the plaintiff. Of course, if the only issue in the case is that to which the
presumption applies, the adverse party's failure to meet the burden of going forward would warrant
a directed verdict against that party. N.C. R. EVID. 301 commentary.
74. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 369, 368 S.E.2d at 586.
75. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 3 for a list of the elements of a death benefits claim.
78. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 ("Probably the commonest reason for
defeated claims is simply the general inadequacy of proof connecting the injury medically with the
employment."); Comment, Injury by Accident in Workers' Compensation: Alternatives to an Outmoded Doctrine, 59 N.C.L. REV. 175, 205-11 (1980) (proposing New York's wear and tear rule and
other alternative formulations for the accident element and stating, "Of course in New York, as in
North Carolina, medical causation in fact must also be established." (emphasis added)); see supra
note 11.
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establish a medical cause of death. In Harrisv. Henry'sAuto Parts,Inc.,79 Taylor v. Twin City Club,8 0 and Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, Inc.,81 however,
the unexplained death doctrine created presumptions or inferences only on the
arising-out-of-employment element.8 2 Professor Larson has stated specifically
that the unexplained death doctrine does not compensate for the failure to pro-

duce medical cause of death evidence:
[T]he unexplained-death rule is designed for cases in which, by the
nature of the facts, the claimant cannot reasonably be expected to furnish the usual evidence on cause of death. When this is not so, the
presumption should not be expected to take the place of normal medical evidence
establishing the nature of the injury and its relation to the
83
death.
In Pickrell the unexplained death doctrine was applied to do precisely that

which Professor Larson stated it should not. The claimant in Pickrellmade no
showing of inability to produce medical evidence. Justice Meyer, in dissent,
noted that the claimant did not produce even a death certificate, much less medi84
cal expert testimony or an autopsy report.
The Pickrell court itself quoted authorities stating that the presumption or

inference arising from the unexplained death doctrine relates only to the issue of
whether the death or injury arose out of employment.85 There is thus no au79. 57 N.C. App. 90, 91, 290 S.E.2d 716, 717, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 384, 294 S.E.2d 208
(1982); see supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
80. 260 N.C. 435, 439, 132 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1963); see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying
text.
81. 220 N.C. 246, 247, 17 S.E.2d 20, 21 (1941) ("Did the accident arise out of the employment?
On this record, this is the decisive question." (emphasis added)); see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text; see also DeVine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N.C. 684, 685, 44 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1947) (death
resulting from accident occurring while employee was "in the discharge of his duties ... permits the
inference ... that it was a compensable injury"); Rewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 226 N.C. 325,
327, 38 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1946) ("Whether [the accident] arose out of employment is the mooted question." (emphasis added)).
82. Medical evidence is a component of the accident element and perhaps death-proximatelyresulting-from-injury, but not "arising out of employment." Professor Larson states,
The issue [of compensability of injuries arising out of idiopathic conditions, but exacerbated by employment, and thus arising out of employment] must be carefully distinguished
from the medical question whether thefinal injury or death was in fact the result of thefall

itself, rather than of the heart attack or other idiopathic condition. When a man suffers a
severe blow on the head and a heart attack in one accident, it becomes necessary to disentangle the chain of causation and determine whether it was the head injury or the heart
condition that caused the death.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 12.10, at 3-308 n.1 (emphasis added). Thus, in Rews, 226 N.C. at
328, 38 S.E.2d at 99, while the cause of deceased's fall from the window and whether it arose out of
employment was not determinable, it was clear that the cause of his death was the impact from the
fall, not the Crone's disease afflicting him. See supra notes 45, 49. In De Vine, 227 N.C. at 685, 44
S.E.2d at 78, the cause of deceased's death was found to be the cracking of his skull upon the cement
platform. The unknown factor was why he fell and whether the fall arose out of employment. See
supra notes 45, 49; see also Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 372-73, 368 S.E.2d at 587 (Meyer, J., dissenting) ("I
note that the unexplained death provisions upon which Professor Larson relies in his treatise to
justify the use of a presumption in a claimant's favor apply only when the cause of death is known,
but the circumstances are not.").
83. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 10.32(a), at 3-122 to -123.
84. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 374, 368 S.E.2d at 588 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
85. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586 (quoting 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 10.32,
at 3-100; 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 513 (1958)).
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thority for the proposition that the unexplained death doctrine and the positional risk doctrine may relate to other elements of the workers' compensation
claim, such as accident and medical cause of death. All authority is to the
contrary.
Having loosened the bond between the unexplained death doctrine, as applied in Harris,and the arising-out-of-employment element, the Pickrell court
also stated that the McGill presumption against suicide was not limited to the
accident element, but helped to prove work-relatedness as well. 86 All authority
for the presumption in McGill, however, states that the presumption relates only
to one element. The McGill court declared the presumption to be of "accident
only";87 the Workers' Compensation Act shifts the burden of proof to the defendant only on the issue of suicide;88 and the common-law presumption only
helps disprove suicide.89 None of these authorities suggests this presumption
has general application to all elements of the workers' compensation claim.
The Pickrellcourt might have argued that medical cause of death is a component ingredient of the accident element 90 that the McGill presumption specifically addressed. Applying the McGill accident presumption, therefore, would
offset the absence of medical evidence. The Pickrell court did not make this
connection, however, perhaps because the presumption in McGill operated only
against the defense that the deceased committed suicide. Notwithstanding this
shortcoming, even if the presumption established all components of the accident
element, leapfrogging the medical evidence requirement, it does not help prove
the separate death-proximately-caused element.
Despite the antithetical cast of all the authority, the supreme court found
that the McGill and Harris presumptions, "read together, support the proposition that the presumption is really one of compensability." 9 1 By naming the
presumption one of "compensability" and by stating that the presumption "may
be used to help a claimant carry his burden of proving that death was caused by
accident, or that it arose out of the decedent's employment, or both," ' 92 the court
created a wild card presumption, applicable to any element of the claim. Thus,
the Pickrell court judicially has added North Carolina to the small minority of
jurisdictions that recognize a general presumption of compensability in workers'
compensation claims, albeit only in the unexplained death context. The other
jurisdictions that follow such a doctrine have enacted it expressly in their workers' compensation statutes. 93 The North Carolina General Assembly's failure to
86. Id. at 368, 368 S.E.2d at 585.
87. McGill, 215 N.C. at 754, 3 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added); see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 67.
89. See supra note 67.
90. See supra notes 3, 78, 82.
91. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 368, 368 S.E.2d at 585.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-321(l) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.26 (West 1981); MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 7A (Law. Co-op. 1976); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 21 (McKinney 1965);
see also Note, The Presumption of Compensability in the Workers' Compensation Act, 30 How. L.J.
505, 506-513 (1988) (discussing the Washington, D.C. Workers' Compensation Act).
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include a wild card presumption probably was purposeful. The express presumptions located in other parts of the statute demonstrate the General Assem94
bly's ability to draft presumptions when desired.
An alternative interpretation of the Pickrell decision is that the court dispensed with the element analysis of the workers' compensation claim because of
the unexplained death context. The court's assessment of McGill and Harris
indicates this approach. The court characterized the two cases as "in effect,
merg[ing] the elements of 'arising out of' and 'accident.' "95 Additionally, the
court stated that there was "no reason not to apply a presumption of compensability where the evidence shows that death occurred while the decedent was
within the course and scope of employment, but the medical reason for death is
96
not adduced."
The view that the Pickrell court intended to abandon the element analysis
finds further support in Chief Justice Exum's assertion that the McGill court did
not analyze the arising-out-of-employment element, but only the "accident" element, and that the Harriscourt did not inquire into the "accident" element, but
only into whether the employee's death arose out of employment. From these
conspicuous gaps in the courts' analyses, the Chief Justice concluded that the
McGill and Harris presumptions do not relate purposefully or solely to specific
elements, but rather help the claimant in a general way to prove a work-related
97
death theory.
The court's conclusion is not inescapable by any means. The failure of the
McGill and Harriscourts to examine other issues of the workers' compensation
claims has other possible explanations. In both cases the other elements were
not in controversy on appeal. In Harristhe court of appeals stated at the outset,
"This case requires resolution of a dispute regarding only one of the elements,
the 'arising out of' element."' 98 Because defendant did not challenge the Commission's conclusions as to other elements, there was no need for the court to
consider them. Thus, the court's failure to consider elements other than "arising
out of" does not imply that the other elements of the claim were unimportant or
did not require proof.
A similar justification exists for the McGill court's failure to address elements other than accident. The McGill court identified the Commission's failure
to give effect to the presumption against suicide, supported by both statutory
and common law. It therefore remanded the case to the Commission for application of the legal principles the court had articulated. The court stated that the
94. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-3 (1985) (presumption that all employees and employers come
under provisions of statute); id. § 97-5 (contracts of service presumed to continue subject to Workers' Compensation Act); id. § 97-39 (widow, widower, or dependent child conclusively presumed to
be dependent for support upon deceased employee).
95. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 368, 368 S.E.2d at 585 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 369, 368 S.E.2d at 585-86.
97. Id. at 368, 368 S.E.2d at 585.
98. Harris v. Henry's Auto Parts, Inc., 57 N.C. App. 90, 91, 290 SE.2d 716, 717, disc. rev.
denied, 306 N.C. 384, 294 S.E.2d 208 (1982). The Industrial Commission's finding concerning this
element was the only ruling defendant questioned on appeal. Defendant Appellant's Brief at 1,
Harris (No. 81101C802).
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Commission "may proceed tofindings offact and a determination of the claim in
accordance with prescribed practice." 99 Because the Industrial Commission
had to retry the facts of the case, further comment by the court regarding other
elements was unnecessary.
Other language in McGill clearly embraces the elemental analysis of the
workers' compensation claim. The court stated that the presumption or inference arose to allow a finding of "accident-a constituent part of the condition
antecedent to compensation, injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment." 10 0 The court stated further that "this inference is sufficient to
raise a prima facie case as to accident only." 10 1 The McGill court thus reaffirmed the proof-of-elements approach to workers' compensation claims even as
it applied the presumption against suicide to prove one of those elements.
In summary, McGill, Harris,and the unexplained death and positional risk
doctrines do not support either theory upon which the result in Pickrell may be
based. These authorities neither suggest the demise of the elemental aspect of
the workers' compensation claim nor do they create a floating presumption to be
applied to any element missing the required quantum of proof. The presumptions in the prior cases relate specifically to single elements. Claimant in
Pickrell, therefore, might have been entitled to separate inferences or presumptions on the accident and arising-out-of-employment elements, but no authority
exists for a general presumption of compensability covering all elements.
In addition to its suspect analysis of the elements of the workers' compensation claim addressed by presumptions, the Pickrellcourt applied precedent in a
peculiar manner to recognize a true presumption of compensability, rather than
a mere inference.10 2 After having discussed McGill and Harris in the course of
analyzing the relationship between presumptions or inferences and singular elements of the claim, the court completely dropped Harris from its discussion of
the evidentiary effect of the newly recognized presumption of compensability.
The court found that the evidentiary device in McGill was a true presumption
and that Pickrell was entitled to a presumption of compensability of similar effect.10 3 As a result, the court directed that on remand the "defendant must
come forward with some evidence that death occurred as a result of a non-compensable cause; otherwise, the claimant prevails." 1 4
The court's failure to consider Harrisat this point of the decision is difficult
to understand. Harris carried forward the ambivalence between inference and
105
presumption that appeared in previous unexplained death doctrine cases.
99. McGill, 215 N.C. at 755, 3 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 754, 3 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 371, 368 S.E.2d at 586.
103. Id. at 371, 368 S.E.2d at 586-87; see also supra note 7 (discussing the effect of a true
presumption).
104. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 371, 368 S.E.2d at 586.
105. Harris, 57 N.C. App. at 95, 290 S.E.2d at 719 ("[W]e indulge a presumption or inference
that his death arose out of the employment." (emphasis added)). Moreover, the procedural posture
of Harrisdid not indicate the effect of a true presumption as opposed to an inference, since the court

19891

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

1537

Taylor and Robbins repeatedly spoke of a "presumption or inference," but applied the effect of an inference.' 0 6 These cases, in contrast to McGill, appear to
militate against recognizing a true presumption, yet the Pickrell court ignored
this conflict.
Instead, the Pickrellcourt relied entirely on the effect given to the evidentiary device in McGill for its conclusion that claimant could rely on a true presumption. The court correctly assessed McGill as having applied a presumption,
10 7
rather than an inference, despite confusion about that issue within McGill.
The court did not explain adequately, however, the parallel it drew between
McGill and Pickrell. The McGill presumption of accident was enacted expressly
by statute. 10 8 No statute requires the presumption described by Pickrell. It is
unclear, therefore, why the Pickrellpresumption more closely resembles the McGill presumption than the Harris inference. The disappearance of Harris from
the decision at this stage cuts against the Pickrell court's earlier argument that
the Harris and McGill presumptions are the same presumption of workrelatedness.109
Finally, after recognizing the presumption of compensability and analyzing
its effect, the Pickrellcourt stated that practical concerns justify the presumption
because it is fair and serves the policy of liberal construction of the Workers'
Compensation Act.110 The court noted that the employer can develop evidence
regarding circumstances of death more easily because he assigns work to the
employee and knows its risks and because he is usually the last to see the employee alive. 1 As for medical cause of death evidence, the court stated that an
employer may seek an autopsy from the county medical examiner and offer the
death certificate in evidence "if [the] employer[ ] deem[s] it necessary to deter' 12
mine the medical reason for death."
In this portion of the decision, the court confuses the unexplained death
doctrine with the new presumption of compensability. The circumstances of
death evidence, which the employer can prove more easily than the claimant,
consists only of the manner in which the death occurred-the evidence that
would prove whether the accident arose out of employment. In Pickrell, for
of appeals affirmed an award by the Industrial Commission, rather than reversing a denial of
benefits.
106. See supranote 43 and accompanying text; see also Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435,
440, 132 S.E.2d 865, 869 (1963) "The facts found by the Commission in the instant case permit the
inference that the fall had its origin in the employment." (emphasis added)); DeVine v. Dave Steel
Co., 227 N.C. 684, 685, 44 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1947) ("This permits the inference, which the Commission
has drawn, that it was a compensable injury." (emphasis added)); Rewis v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
226 N.C. 325, 330, 38 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1946) ("The proof adduced at the hearing would seem to
permit the inferences drawn by the Commission, even though other inferences may appear equally
plausible." (emphasis added)); Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, 220 N.C. 246, 248, 17 S.E.2d 20,
21 (1941) ("No other sufficient explanation appearing ....the conclusion that the injury arose out of
the employment was permissible and should be sustained." (emphasis added)).
107. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
108. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1985); supra note 67.
109. See supra note 86.
110. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586; see supra note 29.
111. Pickrell, 322 N.C. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586.
112. Id. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-383 (1986).
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example, the employer had a better opportunity than the claimant to observe
whether performance of his duty caused the deceased to fall from the bumper of
the van. This advantage, which the employer admittedly possesses, is traditionally the primary argument in support of the unexplained death doctrine." t3 In a
situation like this, the court provides the claimant a presumption or inference on
the arising-out-of-employment element because it is unfair to require practically
unobtainable proof.
The employer does not have an advantage in access to or production of
medical cause of death evidence, however. In PickrellJustice Meyer argued in
dissent that the survivor has better access to medical evidence because he has a
statutory right to an autopsy. The employer's ability to obtain an autopsy, on
the other hand, rests in the medical examiner's discretion. 1 4 Therefore, the
traditional reason for applying a presumption or inference displacing the ordinary evidentiary burden fails to exist with medical cause of death evidence. The
Pickrell court, however, did not actually assert that the employer has a better
opportunity to obtain medical evidence. Rather, the court stated the employer
could produce the evidence, if it thought medical cause of death important.'I5
The court apparently was not shifting the burden as to medical cause of death
evidence by means of the presumption, but was converting medical cause of
death from a vital component of the accident and death-proximately-resultingfrom-injury elements to an affirmative defense available to defendant. The court
failed, however, to state any authority for its position. The Pickrell court's conclusion that the presumption of compensability was fair to the employer flies in
the face of the General Assembly's concept of fairness, as expressed in the workers' compensation statute.
Statutes, not common law, create workers' compensation claims. "1 6 The
statute represents a carefully crafted balance of the interests of employers and
employees. It improves a worker's chances of recovery without exposing the
employer to prohibitive liability.' 17 Broad, judicially created exceptions or departures from the analysis prescribed by statute potentially upset this balance.
Although unforeseen situations that place an extraordinary burden on one party
inevitably require doctrines altering the evidentiary burdens, the development of
such doctrines is less likely to upset the balance of interests set by the General
Assembly if the doctrines are defined restrictively and created only when the
favored party faces a truly unfair disadvantage.
In creating a presumption of compensability, the Pickrell court probably
did not proceed cautiously enough. Claimant in Pickrell was able to prove that
the deceased was acting in the course and scope of employment and that he
8
died. 18
Because of circumstantial physical evidence, the court inferred, in the
113. See I A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 10.32, at 3-103 to -110.
114. Pickrell,322 N.C. at 373-74, 368 S.E.2d at 588 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see N.C. GEN. SrAT.
§§ 130A-389(a), 130A-398 (1986); see also id. § 130A-383 (medical examiner's jurisdiction).
115. See supra text accompanying note 112.
116. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

1989]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

1539

claimant's favor, that an accident occurred.' 19 Because of the unexplained death
doctrine, claimant was entitled to a presumption or inference that the injury
arose out of employment. 1 20 Claimant failed, however, to offer any evidence
that decedent's injury was medically caused by the inferred accident or that
death was proximately caused by injury, nor did claimant offer an explanation
for the failure to produce this evidence. The North Carolina Supreme Court,
nevertheless, created an evidentiary presumption broad enough to allow claimant to recover.
The Pickrell decision has made it easier for a claimant to make out a claim
for unobserved injury or death than for one that is observed. The presumption
places the onus upon an employer to discover any diseases afflicting the deceased
2
and to prove one of them was the medical cause of death.1 1 This allocation of
the evidentiary burden might not be disturbing when the employee has been run
over by a truck, but the fairness is far from evident when a fifty-seven-year-old
employee, like Mr. Pickrell, 122 is found dead with scarcely a mark on his body.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the supreme court's decision in
Pickrell, however, is that the court presents its decision as a restatement of existing case law. No presumption or inference previously presented in North Carolina workers' compensation law applies to multiple elements of a claim or
submerges the element-by-element analysis set forth in the Workers' Compensation Act. If the court perceived inequities in Pickrell sufficient to justify a new,
broader doctrine for reallocating evidentiary burdens, a full explanation of the
necessity and framework of the new doctrine would have been in order.
JAMES DANIEL BISHOP

119.
120.
121.
122.

See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
See Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 3, Pickrell (No. 8610IC69).

